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Abstract  
 
The paper1 examines the factors that played a major role in development of the old-age pension 
system in Georgia. Based on data collected from 1991–2009, this analysis centers on the 
system’s patterns of development and identifies four main attempts to reform the old-age 
pension system. Economic performance, demographic aging, domestic political constellations, 
and external influence are traditionally thought to be responsible for the pension system 
reforms. Qualitative data analyses and in-depth interviews have been used to test these 
explanations. This analysis did not confirm the hypotheses, but it revealed that fiscal 
constraints and international technical assistance were the main factors behind reforms during 
the first two chronological attempts to change the system. Political factors and liberal 
economic ideology influenced the patterns of old-age pension policy development from 2004–
2008, while the negative outcomes of the Russian-Georgian War and World Financial Crisis 
are currently the major obstacles for comprehensive pension reforms. The limitations of this 
study suggest that in order to clarify the exact nature of old-age pension system, shorter time 
periods and separate reform initiatives should be investigated.  
 
Keywords: transition, political economy, retirement, pension reforms, Georgian government  
 
 
Introduction  
 
In Soviet Georgia the old-age pension system had been gradually developing as an integral part of the 
state welfare policy. In accordance with the ideological and political goals, the pension system was 
born entirely of the state and retirement payments that were financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis 
through the transfer of funds from state-owned enterprises to the USSR State Insurance Company, 
Gosstrakh, which had a department in Georgia. The Soviet retirement pension system consisted of two 
parts, a public component and a voluntary component, which together provided relatively generous 
old-age pension benefits.2 To receive a pension, workers were required to have participated in the labor 
force for a minimum of twenty years for women and twenty-five for men.3 According to Castel and 
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Fox, the pre-transition Soviet pension system was a complex and expensive mechanism, “combining 
elements of a Western European 1960s PAYG system with peculiar communist features.”4 In the late 
1980s old-age pension coverage nearly reached a universal level, paying between 60 percent and 100 
percent of the average wage.5 
 
However, as almost all dimensions of economic and social life, the public pension systems had been 
challenged by the turmoil of the 1990s. After the first few years of transition, institutions of 
representative democracy have emerged, a new legal infrastructure has been installed, and the private 
sector has developed; whereas the question of fundamentally reforming the existing set of welfare 
policies, including pension arrangements, had attracted little attention.6 Although the problems facing 
Georgia were common to all transition economies, they were aggravated by the specific circumstances 
of the country. On the revenue side, shrinking contribution bases and poor administration of revenue-
generating systems had destabilized resources for pension expenditure. On the benefit side, 
demographic aging, shrinking participation in the labor force, and growing informal employment had 
led to a marked increase in the number of pensioners compared to the number of contributors. Old-age 
pensions became low, unfair, and were not sufficient to protect the pensioners from falling into 
extreme poverty.7 
 
The inability of the new socioeconomic environment to provide sustainable social security system was 
“one of the reasons for the general mistrust of democratic and market reforms.”8 After the Rose 
Revolution in 2003, the Georgian government made an unequivocal choice for the liberalization of 
economy with fundamental changes in existing social policies. These tendencies inevitably affected the 
old-age pension system. Therefore this paper seeks to answer what determined the development9 of the 
old-age pension system in Georgia, and whether policy changes and unimplemented reforms can be 
explained by economic and fiscal problems, by political limitations on available reform choices, by a 
combination of these factors, or by some other circumstances. To reach any conclusions about the 
relative validity of the arguments surrounding Georgia’s pension system reforms, it essential to 
establish the nature of the development of pension system from a specific starting point: the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. This study also intends to reveal the problems the old-age pension system has 
faced and to evaluate the achievability of the reform endeavors.     
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In order to answer the research questions, the methodology of this study analyzes the scope of the 
changes that occurred and reveals the factors determining the old-age pension system’s development. 
In addition to the nature of the research questions, the methodological approach was defined by time 
and resource constraints. There are substantial trade-offs between qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
the dependent and independent variables, the length and depth of the account, and the availability and 
reliability of data sources. Nonetheless, to achieve the research goals, this study consecutively applied 
the evaluation of relevant academic scholarship, qualitative data analysis, and in-depth interviews as 
complementary approaches. As a result of the field data collection, much of the information came 
directly from the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs (MOLHSA), Social Subsides Agency 
(SSA), and the Parliament of Georgia. In-depth interviews were conducted with major stakeholders, 
including decision-makers at the Ministry on Reforms Coordination, MOLHSA, SSA, economic 
experts, and the representatives of private insurance companies and relevant civil society organizations.  
 
Hypothetical Explanations on Old-Age Pension Reforms 
 
This section presents hypothetical explanations on both old-age pension policy change and the system’s 
resistance to reforms given by various authors and observations mainly from the transition economies. 
On the one hand, economic recession and demographic aging are assumed to destabilize public pension 
finances and consequently create pressures for policy reform; while on the other hand, political actors 
and the environment can affect old-age pension system development.    
 
Pressure Factors 
 
Theories on the economic sustainability of old-age public pension systems assume that pressures for 
change derive from financial deficits.10 Chlon-Dominczak and Mora, through a survey of policymakers 
and pension experts, found that the scope of fiscal problems influences reform commitment and leads 
toward change.11 Growing expenditure and decreasing revenues could create opportunity for reformers 
who were previously prevented from taking the initiative.12 The recession, during the first years of 
transition, was associated with enormous shifts in production structures and a corresponding decrease 
in wages and increase in unemployment.13 As a response to this situation, governments often applied a 
policy of substituting open unemployment with early retirement programs at the expense of increased 
expenditure of public pension systems.14 The harsh recessions considerably deteriorated the revenue 
base of the old-age pension system and created imminent fiscal deficits.15 In line with the decline of the 
formal economy and employment, transition countries saw rapid growth in informal activity levels 
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which was beyond the reach of old-age social security contribution agencies, further resulting in a loss 
of revenues for financing public pension benefits.16  
 
The economic stagnation and fiscal deficits represented the immediate pressures on the consecutive 
governments in transition economies to adjust the pension system, but the intensifying long-term 
strains also resulted from the impact of demographic aging, as the proportion of the elderly in 
populations had been rapidly rising.17 As benefits paid out were rising accordingly, outflow from the 
old-age pension systems were exceeding contributions, requiring increases in employees’ or 
employers’ contributions or budget transfers.18 The old-age dependency ratio, measuring the share of 
the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged 15–64, most noticeably increased in the 
Baltic States and Croatia.19 In turn, this rise could be explained by the changing life expectancy and 
mortality patterns, the decreasing fertility rates below the replacement rate,20 and the intensifying 
trends of the negative net migration.  
 
Despite the severe socioeconomic situation, life expectancy had been increasing among the elderly 
during the 1990s, creating a strain on old-age pension systems.21 Simultaneously, mortality rates among 
the working-age population, which had increased in the majority of transition countries, might also 
have had an immediate effect on old-age dependency ratios. Also, a pattern of changes in fertility rates 
affects the old-age dependency ratios and creates strong pressure for reforms within several years 
because the current fertility rates are typically employed for the extrapolation of future trends as a 
rationale for changes.22 In less than a decade after 1989, total fertility in transition economies had fallen 
from a replacement rate to about two-thirds of this level, making Eastern Europe the region with the 
lowest fertility rate in the world.23 In the short term the most important demographic factor creating 
pressure for public pension policy reform could be negative net migration, because it led to the outflow 
of a predominantly working-age population.24   
 
Political Factors 
 
An account of the political set of hypothesized relationships is a more challenging task than 
considering the effect of pressure factors on pension system development. Most political economy 
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theories consider the political environment, such as the fragmentation of political power25 and 
differences in governing bodies and institutions,26 as a central explanation for policy development. 
State-centered theories recognize the state and its policies as more than neutral, influencing pension 
system development as an autonomous agent;27 while the new-pluralism assumes that public pension 
systems are determined by patterns of democratic political competition among different non-class 
based interest groups.28 It is assumed that the politicians in the beginning of transition enjoyed a 
“honeymoon” period and greater freedom for maneuver in policies, as difficult decisions could simply 
be blamed as being part of the outgoing government’s legacy.29 According to Wagener, however, 
during the first years of transition, social policy reform seldom deserved “[its] own chapter either in 
reform literature of in reform policy program.”30   
  
In addition to reformers, other domestic actors in pension policy development were the political parties, 
the ministries and other governmental agencies, the experts and trade unions, public opinion, and 
representatives of financial and capital markets. The impact of political actors on pension system 
development may be illustrated by the electoral competition among parties in the Czech Republic for 
the 1996 elections, when five main political forces designed their own approaches and included public 
pension system development in their electoral programs,31 while in Estonia trade unions successfully 
opposed employers’ organizations which were suggesting taxing both employers and employees.32 
According to Crepaz, parliamentarianism arguably creates more opportunities for policy development 
because it establishes stronger party discipline, greater legislative power, and the centralization of 
accountability.33 On the contrary, Brooks argues that presidential systems generally mean lower 
incomes and smaller social security system – two variables that simplify policy change.34 Political 
environments in which these institutions function also matter. In a democracy, parties which decrease 
old-age benefits can expect to face the wrath of the old-age population, while authoritarian 
governments are granted more freedom to conduct policy adjustment.35 
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Another explanation on pension policy reforms is the direct and indirect influence of external 
economic, political, and ideological factors in shaping the old-age pension policies.36 According to 
Deacon and Hulse, the making of transitional pension policy was a “testing ground for the future of 
social policy elsewhere in the industrialized world.”37 Throughout the 1990s the analysis of pension 
systems, the design of recommendations and reform strategies, and assistance in various forms for the 
reformer countries have been the central issues on the agenda of the influential international and 
regional organizations.38 Since its main interest stemmed from the macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
implications of public pension development, the World Bank specifically addressed in its seminal 
report the public pension systems in the transition economies.39 Contrary to this position, an underlying 
assumption of the European Union and the Council of Europe’s policy for transition countries was the 
duty of the state to protect the vulnerable regardless the concerns of the economic efficiency.40 The 
International financial institutions also frequently discussed old-age security systems in the transition 
states in connection to the financial sector, capital markets, and domestically available sources for long-
term investment.41  
 
First Stage of Development: Economics of Pensions 
 
Reforms of the pension system are the changes in the totality of institutions, procedures, and resources 
drawn on to ensure a replacement income during retirement age. Four attempts of initiating systemic 
changes in the old-age pension system can be distinguished: the first two were made consecutively in 
1998–99 and 2002–03, while from 2004 the reforms continued in two different directions.    
 
Emergence of a Reform Agenda  
 
The socioeconomic collapse associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Georgia was 
reinforced by the civil wars, which sparked the national macroeconomic crisis, precarious fiscal 
conditions and completely destroyed the inherited old-age pension system. Simultaneously, Georgia 
unsuccessfully tried to recover its share of the Gosstrakh’s funds, approximately 550 million USD, 
which had been seized by the Russian Federation.42 Throughout the first half of 1990s the tax system 
malfunctioned, and in 1994 the amount of pensions became nominal. In 1995 the Government turned 
down the system of differentiated pensions and replaced it with flat payments. The pension benefits 
were determined by simple arithmetic: the number of those formally employed in the population was 
multiplied by the average salary and tax tariff, and then revenues were divided by the number of 
pensioners.43 This meant that equal pensions were granted to all retirees regardless of their salaries 
during employment, length of service, or differences in pension type. In 1996 the parametric 
                                                            
36
 Bob Deacon, The new Eastern Europe: Social Policy Past, Present and Future (London: Sage Publication, 1992).  
37
 Bob Deacon and Michelle Hulse, “The making of post-communist social policy: The role of the international agencies,” 
Journal of Social Policy, vol. 26:1 (1995): 43.  
38
 Monika Queisser, “Pension Reform and International Organizations: from Conflict to Convergence,” International Social 
Security Review, vol. 53:2 (2000): 31-45.  
39
 World Bank, Averting the Old Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 1994).   
40
 Deacon and Hulse, 1995.  
41
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option of interstate debt restructuring with Russian Federation.  
43
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adjustments of the system resulted in the retirement age being increased by five years for men and 
women respectively, cancellation of the early retirement provisions and introduction of a right on old-
age pension benefits only for those who previously contributed to the system.44     
 
The problems of the pension system were further aggravated by a serious economic crisis at the end of 
the 1990s. This critical situation created by the poor collection of tax revenues was transformed into the 
large-scale financial crisis, mainly as a result of the economic problems that developed in the CIS 
countries.45 The economic reforms, including privatization, were in their early stages, and the 
inefficient public sector remained large. At the same time, the country had one of the lowest tax 
collection rates (9 percent of GDP) among the transition economies, and the government had been 
reluctant to initiate taxation reforms.46 The non-compliance with the plan for the state budget occurred, 
and was followed by the growth of arrears in state liabilities. The National Bank, however, reported 
that the final outcome only came to 68 percent of what had originally been projected. 47 Economic 
reform produced significant changes in the employment structure, while the number of self-employed 
significantly exceeded the number of those in formal employment. The economic hardship also 
determined that many Georgian citizens decided to leave the country. The demographic burden was 
intensified by the growing mortality and decreasing fertility rates. At the end of the 1990s the 
population over age fifty-nine made up 18.6 percent, up from only 14.4 percent in 1989.48    
 
The impact of fiscal constraints on the old-age pension system was first recognized by the officials of 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security who initiated an initial agenda on old-age pension reforms. It 
was assumed that the first step for changes had to be part of a well-drafted legislative framework to 
give to ultimate decision-makers a clear picture what needed to be done. After the introduction of a 
new state constitution in 1995, all Soviet laws, including those on social security, were annulled.49 
Therefore, every reform attempt of the old-age pension system was associated with changes in the 
broader concept of social security in the country. The legislative package that was developed in line 
with the Act on State Pensions involved the Acts on State Social Insurance and Medical Examination. 
Although the bills envisaged the differentiation of old-age pensions according to amounts of 
contributions and period of payments, they did not imply any pension formula or other means to 
calculate differentiated pension benefits.50     
 
Ultimately, the bill was not approved, and in 1999 the government established a working group with a 
more ambitious initiative in which the influence of the World Bank, with its retirement pension 
orthodoxy, became apparent. According to this reform project, the three pillar old-age pension system 
was considered as a suitable option for Georgia. The proposed model envisaged the establishment of 
the mandatory state pension fund, providing payment of minimal old-age pensions, the mandatory non-
state pension insurance, and the voluntary private old-age pension insurance. The actors behind the 
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proposed scheme hoped that it would attract a reputable international insurance company that would 
assume repayment of the existing arrears and provision of old-age pensions benefits by assigning to it 
the exclusive right to administer 13.5 percent of social taxes.51 However, the implementation of 
reforms was problematic mainly because the government was still engaged in broad political and 
economic reforms. The political environment was fragile, with the president’s assassination attempt 
and the hotly contested parliamentary elections. Other obstacles were systemic corruption, poor 
administration of the pension system, high social taxes, and ongoing underperformance by the tax 
administration. In addition, there were no strong leaders who would project the future benefits of 
pension reforms.52       
 
“Revolutionary Victim” 
 
A new, ambitious initiative on reforming the state’s social assistance schemes was declared in 2002–
03. This period turned out to be very hard on the pension system. At the end of 2003 the ongoing 
pension arrears amounted 14 percent of the central budget, while the average pension equaled 19 
percent of the minimum subsistence level of an adult.53 The beginning of the 2000s was characterized 
by the low level of economic growth, moderate rates of inflation, and permanent sequestering of the 
state budget. As a result, the employment level, labor productivity, and real income of the population 
remained unchanged. Internal demand failed to become a stable factor of economic growth.54 The vast 
majority of the population was forced to engage in poorly paid, temporary jobs and was unable to 
secure minimum living standards. The negative net migration remained high, while fertility levels 
continued to decrease.55 The government was unable to fulfill its core budget parameters, mainly due to 
the fiscal authorities’ ineffectiveness, and deficiencies in the tax legislation. In addition, after the 
suspension of financing under the IMF-supported financial program, external sources became 
unavailable.56 In 2003 expenditures constituted only 77 percent of the initial plan, leading to growing 
pension arrears. The precarious condition of the budget sector drove the country to the real threat of 
default.57   
 
These developments had a twofold impact on the old-age pension system. On the one hand, it generated 
the understanding that the old-age pension policy had to be amended, but, on the other hand, the 
stakeholders realized that in order to implement paradigmatic reforms, the administrative and 
parametric mechanisms of the system had to be fixed. These constraints created a vicious circle, though 
in the light of upcoming parliamentary elections, the government announced the systemic pension 
reforms to establish a new multi-pillar and financially sustainable old-age pension system.58 At the 
same time, the World Bank actively engaged in the process, trying to advocate its own vision of 
pension reforms, and helped the government to draft new bills and design tax incentives for voluntary 
pension accounts. The authorities believed that their initiative was a compromised model of pension 
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reforms; however, virtually no parties lobbied for these amendments through formal or informal 
consultations. The stakeholders only agreed on the necessity of repayment of pension arrears and on the 
introduction of the three-pillar pension model in principle, while a unified approach could not be 
reached on a transition to the mandatory private schemes, reduction of taxes for pension savings, and 
differentiation of public pension benefits.59   
 
Nevertheless, the pension reforms had become one of the mainstream policy issues for the government. 
In particular, a package of draft bills was drawn up by the State United Social Insurance Fund together 
with the MOLHSA and the World Bank. It included bills on Mandatory Social Insurance, Mandatory 
Pension Insurance, and Introducing Individual Registrations and Individual Accounts for Mandatory 
Social Insurance System.60 Old-age pensions were comprised of two components: a minimal base part, 
which would be warranted and common for everybody who satisfied the requirements for retiring, and 
an insurance part, the amount of which would be differentiated and dependent upon the insurance 
service length and the amount of individual payments put into the account.61 The main characteristic of 
the 2003 initiative was that the mandatory second pillar had to be nominal in nature, which meant that 
the contributions would not be invested through real funded accounts.62 The retirement age for both 
men and women had to be changed to sixty-five63 and minimum insurance longevity to fifteen years. 
The pensions granted had to be increased on an annual basis in accordance with the consumer price 
index. This package of bills was passed by the Parliament and had to enter into force on January 1, 
2004.  
 
However, the implementation of this reform was canceled due to the fundamental political changes in 
late 2003 when a new government came to power. Initially, the introduction of the draft bills was 
postponed until the beginning of 2005, and later the proposal was completely rejected. The opponents 
of this reform initiative criticized its economic rationality. Their own financial projections showed that 
individuals had to save all their working lives and then it would be reflected in extremely low 
replacement rates. These calculations were based on the existing socioeconomic variables, including 
economic growth rates, employment levels and dependency ratios64. The model did not consider 
potential external shocks of an economic, a political, or a military nature. Furthermore, the central 
justification of the reforms – that people would be interested in legalization of their incomes –was 
criticized on the grounds that individuals would not be motivated to participate in a system which was 
ineffective from an economic point of view.65     
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Second Stage of Development: Politics of Pensions 
 
From 2004 two dimensions of the pension system development can be distinguished. On the one hand, 
the changes sought to fight poverty among the elderly, while the government also aimed to create an 
environment for consumption smoothing during the retirement.   
 
Retirement without Poverty  
 
The new government improved the welfare of elderly by improving the public pension system and 
developing a general means-tested social assistance program. The old-age pension system was greatly 
affected by the measures to establish economic and financial order in the country. In 2004 the total 
revenues of the state budget grew by 91.3 percent, while the share of tax revenues of GDP increased to 
18.5 percent. It became possible to redeem salary and pension arrears from previous years.66 The 
authorities also largely managed to eradicate corruption, identify database falsifications, and dismantle 
the special preferences among and within the different groups of pensioners. In December 2005 a new 
Act on State Pensions was adopted. All citizens of Georgia were granted a right to receive the old-age 
pension benefits any time after the age of sixty for women and sixty-five for men. The legislative 
changes were accompanied by the administrative amendments on which the SSA was founded.67 At 
first sight, the introduction of the new legislative framework had to be considered as a major change in 
the old-age pension system, but in reality, the fundamental elements were not amended. The system 
was still based on the principles of solidarity payments and equal pension benefits, and did not 
anticipate the differentiation of pension benefits.68     
 
On the revenue side, the old-age pension system was also affected by new changes to the tax code. 
With regard to social policies, a decision was made to abolish the personified social insurance 
contributions and introduce a common social tax at a rate of 20 percent of all salaries and wages.69 
After this consolidation, the maintenance of records on individual employees and their taxable incomes 
was abolished, which meant that the possible future differentiation of old-age pension became 
technically unfeasible. From 2008 further major changes to the Tax Code were introduced. The social 
tax was annulled, and individuals became responsible for the payment of income tax, at a rate of 25 
percent of their gross earnings.70 Moreover, pension benefits were financed by the general revenues 
line of the state budget. Previously, these contributions were separately accounted for in the state 
budget, and the Tax Department paid less attention to administrating these collections. After their 
inclusion in the central budget, there was an increased incentive for the Tax Department to enhance the 
collection performance of the social contributions.71        
 
                                                            
66
 National Bank of Georgia, Annual report 2004 (Tbilisi: National Bank of Georgia, 2005), 
http://nbg.ge/uploads/publications/annualreport/2003/141.04.2004_1.pdf (accessed September 22, 2008). 
67
 Social Subsidies Agency (SSA), “The objective of Social Subsidies Agency,” Description of Social Subsidies Agency, 
http://www.ssa.gov.ge/index.php?id=31 (accessed July 13, 2008).     
68
 Antadze, 2007.  
69
 Vakhtang Megrelishvili, “Social sector reforms,” in Georgia Human Development Report 2008, Background Papers 
(Tbilisi: UNDP, 2008).    
70
 Ministry of Finance, “Basic Data and Directions,” Tbilisi, 2008. 
71
 USAID,Georgia Fiscal Assessment (The publication produced for review by the United States Agency for International 
Development, 2005). http://georgia.usaid.gov/pdf/2.pdf (accessed August 4, 2008).  
CAUCASIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
VOL. 3 (4) – AUTUMN 2009 
© CRIA 2009 
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OLD-AGE PENSION REFORMS IN GEORGIA  
 
381
On the benefit side, from 2004 the amount of minimal flat old-age pension was initially increased by 
GEL 28 per month, and then by GEL 38 in 2006. After the social unrest in November 2007,72 the 
government increased the old-age pensions by GEL 55. Before this political stalemate, however, the 
increase initially applied only to those pensioners who qualified as being extremely poor in the unified 
social assistance database.73 During the 2008 presidential campaign,74 the opposition coalition 
proposed designing an old-age social security system in which pensions would be calculated based on 
the years of service and individual accomplishments.75 Nonetheless, the existing government remained 
in office, with a consequential announcement that the parametric pension reforms would be one of the 
central elements of its “50-day Program”.76 Since March 2008 minimum pensions have increased by 
GEL 70. The pension replacement rate, however, remained at a very low level, which further 
highlighted the inadequacy of the existing old-age pension system.77 In 2009 the authorities planned to 
increase pensions by USD 100,78 which, for the first time in recent history, would be more than the 
minimum subsistence level of an average consumer.     
 
After effectively dealing with the main technical problems of the public pensions, the government 
realized there were still many obstacles that would burden the system. Senior government officials 
believed that the PAYG scheme was not sustainable in a country which had a shrinking and aging 
population, a negative net migration, and high life expectancy rates.79 Negative trends in the labor 
market, such as high unemployment and informal employment rates, were also weighing the system 
down. At the same time, high levels of poverty in the population required “increasing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of state measures against poverty.”80 According to prevailing logic, growing pension 
expenditure and anti-poverty social assistance had to be financed from the same source of revenues, 
which meant that prioritizing one would come at the expense of the other. Concentrating on the 
increasing universal pension benefits would mean that the government was oriented toward segments 
of the population with medium income, while the most poor would still remain in precarious 
conditions. The trade-off for the government was clear, and the political decision was made to 
prioritize the general means-tested poverty reduction measures over the pension policy.81          
 
From 2004 to 2006 intensive work was performed to introduce properly functioning means-tested 
social assistance system, and in 2008 its database included 41 percent of Georgian households and 38 
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percent of the population of Georgia. The idea was that the government, based on proxy means-tested 
mechanisms, had to spend tax-payers money on those unable to care for themselves by giving them 
cash and different in-kind benefits, such as compensations for communal services, health care, and 
education scholarships.82 Simultaneously, the program has also included about 240,000 of the poorest 
old-age pensioners, almost a third of all retirees. The scheme had potential, if accordingly financed and 
developed, to drastically reduce extreme poverty in the general population. The government also 
presumed that it could maintain the old-age pension system without substantially increasing of the 
universal pension benefits.83 Nevertheless, after the November 2007 unrest, a political decision was 
made that the scarce resources had to be devoted to increasing the general pension benefits for the 
entire aged population, which in turn reduced resources for the effective implementation of the means-
tested social assistance program.84    
 
Achieving a Decent Retirement 
 
From 2004 the authorities started to consider a transition to private pension schemes in order to create 
an environment in which people would be able to independently secure a decent retirement. The old-
age pension reforms were originally at the centre of the political agenda85, but, in fact, there was no 
sound policy framework developed, and no special task force or working group was engaged in pension 
issues on a full-time basis. The government began to argue, however, that within the existing 
environment, current consumption might be more effective than depositing savings for retirement.86 In 
defense of this argument, three main points were emphasized: first, if individuals would deposit savings 
into pension funds, their real benefits from pension annuities would be roughly five times less than 
their pre-retirement incomes due to the existing high economic growth and inflation rates;87 second, the 
government was reluctant to bear the costs of any guarantees of protecting workers’ savings if a 
mandatory system was introduced;88 and third, the introduction of an obligatory system would mean, as 
in the Soviet era, that individuals would not know what was in their best interest.89 Based on these 
notions, the government preferred to withhold the final pension reform decisions and simultaneously 
worked on tax incentives to stimulate general savings.      
 
In early 2008 the parliament approved the government’s package of draft bills, which implied the 
gradual reduction of income tax and the introduction of tax reliefs for incomes stemming from various 
types of deposits.90 The authorities considered this decision as a step toward pension reform because it 
made all investments, including pension savings, more profitable,91 though it did not imply any special 
treatment of retirement accounts. This decision was partially justified by the earlier experience in 2004 
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when the introduction of special tax incentives for private insurance failed to generate a boom in 
pension accounts, although the licensing of the voluntary pension funds substantially increased.92 The 
size of annual old-age public pension payments for 2007 was roughly 300 times larger than the size of 
combined private old-age pension savings since 2001.93 Despite the argument by those who supported 
the tax reliefs that the initiative required a longer time-span before the financial institutions, insurance 
companies and the population would adjust to the new environment: from 2005 the amendments in the 
Tax Code eliminated all tax preferences and depreciated the positive prospects in the private pension 
schemes.94       
 
To counterbalance the government’s approach toward the old-age pension reforms, an initiative was 
taken by parliament in 2006 to establish the Pension Task Force, which was facilitated by the EU 
delegation in Georgia.95 The Pension Task Force saw that the worst option was merely retaining the 
existing pension structure and enabling the increase of pension benefits as the government resources 
allowed.96 After the extensive public consultations, the Pension Task Force proposed the introduction 
of a contributory funded pension system in which currently workers would have the option to join such 
a system. Future pensions would have two components: a monthly pension for life, from age sixty-five, 
equivalent to a capital reserve which would have been built up in a contributor’s personal pension 
account; and second, a transfer to the contributor’s personal pension account of the value of the 
proportion of the current state pension. The pension account would be administered in an autonomous 
pension fund, the assets of which would be managed by private-sector investment managers.97 The 
calculations indicated that with the contribution of 10 percent of earnings, annuities in constant GEL 
2007 would grow from GEL 38 to GEL 100 in some twenty years’ time,98 and in forty years would 
exceed GEL 250.99  
 
In spite of being the most elaborate and up-to-date pension reform plan, the executive government 
disregarded the proposal based on the abovementioned arguments. Among others, the Ministry of 
Finance strongly opposed this initiative due to the projected reduction of current revenues during the 
transition period. It was also argued that the statistical calculations employed in the model were not 
reliable.100 This confrontation indicated that senior executive officials had not only a better 
understanding of the political economy of pensions but also more leverage on the final decision-making 
process, which meant that the Pension Task Force reform initiative could hardly succeed even if its 
approach had been completely credible.101 After the government effectively blocked the proposed 
initiative, the Pension Task Force was forced to adjust its agenda to the government’s line. The idea on 
partially mandatory pension insurance was dismissed, and the work continued just on the development 
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of voluntary pension schemes. The new model intended to enhance and formalize private pension 
mechanisms and create incentives for people to save in these schemes.102       
 
Was Momentum Lost or Gained?  
 
The implementation of systemic pension reforms, as commonly agreed upon, would have been most 
plausible between 2004 and 2007 when the country had excellent fiscal standing. But the reforms still 
would have required substantial financial resources since the government would lose the portion of tax 
revenues redirected to mandatory private pension funds.103 These transition costs could then be 
financed through grants from international organizations and privatization of public assets.104 The 
systemic reforms most likely would also have worsened the government’s political stance by affecting 
the well-being of those cohorts who would not have had the opportunity to save accordingly for their 
retirement.105 Instead, the government preferred to increase the flat-rate pension benefits regularly and, 
as such, contributed to the transformation of the old-age pension expectations into the old-age pension 
liabilities, which not only assumed sustainable provision of benefits but also their ever-increasing 
nature. Furthermore, during the last presidential campaign, the increase of old-age pensions system 
became a way to win the votes of pensioners, a large and politically active group of the population. 
Taking into account the projected demographic and employment characteristics, it will gradually 
become even more difficult to increase pension benefits, whereas subsequent governments might 
occasionally experience heavy pressure from the elderly requiring a decent increase of pension 
benefits.106  
The military confrontation with Russia in August 2008 and the intense effects of the international 
financial crisis had their consequences on old-age pension reform prospects. The slowing economic 
growth rates and shrinking budgetary revenues substantially affected the country’s fiscal health.107 The 
crisis made it much more difficult not only to implement comprehensive pension reforms with an 
introduction of any kind of mandatory private pension provision,108 but it also, at least for several 
years, disrupted accomplishing the promised increase of the flat-rate general pensions benefit by USD 
100.109 However, the recent developments could be also viewed from a different perspective. The crisis 
can boost the position of those who think that a completely privatized pension system is the only 
feasible solution to the problem. Indeed, in the beginning of 2009 the government announced that the 
country needs the promotion of voluntary private pension schemes in which individuals will be able to 
independently secure their best possible retirement prospects.110 The only threatening aspect, though, in 
this development is the potential for a final decision that is made abruptly, without adequate 
consideration of other policy alternatives.  
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Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this account was to clarify what factors have been affecting the old-age pension 
system’s development in Georgia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Through the method of 
evaluation of the selected scholarly literature mainly on the transition economies, there are specific 
hypothetical determinants – economic, demographic, political and international factors – that explain 
pension system development. In order to examine these theoretical explanations, an assessment of the 
changes in old-age pension provision, and two consecutive and chorological attempts of systemic 
amendments as well as two simultaneous and ongoing reform agendas are identifiable. In the first stage 
of development, the bottom-up reform initiative stemming from the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security was blocked by the political indifference in the upper echelons of executive power; and when 
the fiscal problems intensified, the government became interested in gaining political dividends 
through the top-down reform initiative mediated by the World Bank. Demographic aging worsened the 
scope of the pension problem and, therefore, affected reform initiatives, but not in such an illustrative 
manner as did the international influence that played a significant role in all major reform preparations.  
Since 2004, old-age pension reforms have been upgraded to a more mature policymaking level, though 
the government was not able to exploit the post-election “honeymoon” period to conduct systemic 
pension reforms. Thereafter, the state’s priority deviated from the universal old-age pension system to 
the development of universal means-tested social assistance program and presented the general tax 
reduction trend as a component of broader pension reforms, successfully blocking parliamentary 
attempts to introduce mandatory pension savings. On this reform stage, the unbalanced fragmentation 
of political power played a decisive role for the reform outcome. This specific event can also be seen in 
light of the confrontation between the EU-backed reform approach, endorsed by the parliament, and the 
executive government’s position, which was more closely associated with the World Bank’s ideology. 
The military conflict with Russia and the world financial crisis, contrary to expectations, might 
facilitate rather than postpone reforms, though not within the best possible scenario.   
 
Old-age pension reforms in Georgia were only marginally determined by the pluralistic style of 
democratic competition among stakeholders. The reforms were almost exclusively shaped by the 
ministerial, legislative, and government agencies. The political economy of this approach is more in 
line with a state-centered logic of pension policy development, which is mostly shaped by the 
structures that the state imposes. In addition, it is difficult to evaluate a role of democracy in Georgia’s 
old-age pension reform process; however, the government’s drive to introduce a new pension model 
before the 2003 parliamentary elections and the new government’s promise to almost double flat-rate 
old-age pensions during the last presidential campaign may have some implications for committing to a 
policy option preferred by the average voter. Overall, one general observation from this paper is the 
contradictory fact that despite creating political justification for reform, the radical fiscal crisis did not 
lead to the systemic old-age pension changes, while the conducive fiscal environment dampened 
political aspirations toward important paradigmatic reforms. 
 
Clearly, these findings are preliminary and deserve further examination. In spite of an attempt to access 
the most comprehensive data sources, apparently this paper considers a very broad time span, with 
some incomplete sources of information that we unavailable at the time of writing. Further, many key 
stakeholders did not have full information on up-to-date developments. Even the parliamentary Task 
Force and the team at the Ministry on Reform Coordination could not fully coordinate complementary 
activities. Therefore, it is important to promote debate on pension policy through sound research 
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practices. Although definitive answers as to what factors determined pension reforms are difficult to 
pin down, all economic, demographic, political, and international factors matter. The question is still 
how their constellations determine policies in different time periods. Considering this constraint, future 
efficient research designs should ideally concentrate on the analysis of a single reform attempt within a 
shorter research timeframe.    
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Devi Khechinashvili – Head of the Insurance Association of Georgia; 
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